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Abstract
Just before the global crisis soaring commodity prices pushed up inflation significantly, not 
least in EU neighbour countries at the Mediterranean. These price shocks affected public 
finances in the southern Mediterranean region, notably via government subsidies. Partly due 
to lags in the transmission of commodity prices into prices for final users the subsidies burden 
continued to be felt, despite the price falls registered in the wake of the credit crisis. We show 
that downward price rigidities play a role. Recently, commodity price pressures have re-
emerged. We focus on food prices and analyse recent developments in food inflation in 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria 
and Tunisia in comparison with other middle income economies. Subsidies on food and fuel 
are quantified per country for the period 2002-2010. The incremental government subsidies 
entail an estimated deterioration of the government balances of up to more than 2% of GDP 
in 2008 and, for most countries only slight improvements in the global recession year 2009. 
Ensuing longer-term challenges for public finances remain as inflation rises on the back of 
higher global economic growth. As recent events in Tunisia illustrate, these can have 
important political implications. Finally, the paper discusses some options that can lead to 
more efficient government spending, even in the event of sharp swings in prices of basic 
necessities.
1 European Commission, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs, correspondence at 
Ronald.Albers@ec.europa.eu and Marga.Peeters@gmail.com. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the Mediterranean Research Meeting at the European University Institute in Florence in 2008. We thank the 
participants of this workshop for their comments and our colleagues Antonio de Lecea, Stylianos Dendrinos, 
José Eduardo Leandro, Maria Inmaculada Montero Luque, Andreas Papadopoulos and Sirpa Tulla for their 
input. All errors are ours. Disclaimer: The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the European Commission. 
21. Background – challenges to fiscal policy due to surging prices 
In the first part of 2008 the sharp upsurge in inflation, to a large extent driven by a strong 
acceleration in food and energy commodity prices, posed important challenges to policy 
makers across the globe, not least in the southern Mediterranean (MED) region.2 In that 
region, persistent fiscal deficits and high public debt stocks had resulted in debt accumulation 
and structural pressure on public budgets. Sharp swings in prices, driven by commodity 
prices, added to strains on the public budget in the period just preceding the global financial 
crisis. These seriousness of the strains can be traced back to more serious structural 
vulnerabilities in the area of public finances pre-existing in the southern Mediterranean . 
Although recently encouraging public finance reforms have been initiated in the region, 
public finance reform still remains high on the agenda in most Action Plans agreed under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and has been a prominent topic on the agenda of the 
ECOFIN ministerial meetings with southern Mediterranean counterparts held so far. In Rabat-
Skhirat (2005), Ministers agreed that fiscal consolidation and improving budgetary 
institutions and systems were among the four priority areas for reform3 in the Mediterranean 
countries. To a large extent, the challenges faced by MED countries in designing and 
controlling public expenditure are not unlike those in the EU and this is echoed in the policy 
debate on public finance reform that is ongoing both in the EU and in partner countries. The 
global crisis did change the emphasis and urgency of the debate on both sides of the 
Mediterranean in different ways, but the broad common challenges remained in place. 
In a nutshell, this debate has led to two main conclusions: first, fiscal consolidation should be 
part of a broader process of structural and institutional change aimed at lifting the obstacles to 
growth and employment - encompassing both the public sector and product, labour and 
capital markets; and second, fiscal consolidation should go hand in hand with strengthened 
budget management systems and institutions.  
2 In this paper, references to the southern Mediterranean (or MED) countries or region refer to countries that are 
part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia. Libya is an observer. Albania and Mauritania and the very recent 
additions to the circle of countries covered by the in 2008 restyled Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean now formally encompassing the Euro-Med process are therefore not included 
3 The four priorities are: (i) improving the business climate; (ii) further liberalising trade and opening the 
economy while protecting the most vulnerable groups of the population; (iii) upgrading public institutions and 
governance systems; and (iv) consolidating macroeconomic stability and public finance management. 
3However, the sheer size of the price and terms-of-trade shocks that the MED region has 
suffered in the wake of the historically huge swings in food and energy commodity prices 
witnessed recently have added a new dimension to the policy debate. Soaring prices have not 
only had a sizeable macroeconomic and budgetary impact, but also a distributional effect and 
likely led to a more skewed income distribution. Under prevailing policies the upsurge in 
prices also heavily affected government budgets in the southern Mediterranean region, 
notably via subsidy systems. Admittedly, the impact of price shocks in the MED countries has 
been differentiated according to the structure of public spending in individual countries, and 
also in function of past and ongoing reforms. Nevertheless, in view of the relatively high 
prevalence of subsidies in the MED region, the impact on public finances has been large by 
comparison to other regions in the world. The sharp fall of the world economy into recession 
in the latter part of 2008 and 2009 led to a sudden and sharp reversal of commodity prices 
which to an extent mitigated the acute strains that had arisen. Whereas falling commodity 
prices in first instance add to purchasing power and relief strains on the public purse, the 
eventual effect is more uncertain. To the extent that the upsurge and subsequent downswing 
in prices reflected a global boom-bust cycle that impacted on the MED region, incomes and 
public sector accounts suffered from the economic slowdown in 2009. But, the impact of the 
lower global commodity prices on government budgets could be expected to be beneficial. On 
the back of the acceleration of economic growth global commodity prices started rising again 
in 2010, arguably initiating a similar dynamics as in 2008  The relief brought about by the 
impact of the global crisis thus appears to have been temporary. This underlines the 
importance to the policy debate.  
This paper aims to shed more light on the impact of the recent price swings on the economies 
in the southern Mediterranean region, with a heavy emphasis on the feed-through to public 
finance, in particular government balances. The main purpose of this contribution is relatively 
modest: it aims to take stock of the issues involved, which could be built upon in subsequent 
work. It further raises some issues for the policy debate. Due to data constraints, the evidence 
most strongly documents the effect of the strong upsurge in prices until the middle of 2008. 
As the subsequent decline and then rebound are still unfolding, the impact of these recent 
developments is more difficult to judge due to the lags involved. The preliminary nature of 
the work presented precludes the drawing of any firm policy implications. Nevertheless, the 
final section presents some issues for future consideration. 
4The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 puts the recent global food and fuel prices 
shocks in a historical perspective and describes some of the main macroeconomic policy 
lessons from the oil and food crises in the 1970s.  Section 3 documents the impact of the food 
price shocks on the individual ENP Mediterranean countries and compares this with the 
effects on other middle income country groups. In section 4 the impact of commodity prices 
on government budgets in the ENP Mediterranean countries is analysed in depth. Whilst 
acknowledging the pitfalls in making such comparisons across countries, we quantify the 
direct fiscal impact of soaring commodity prices because of the high relevance for the fiscal 
stance, and briefly discuss prospects. Finally, section 5 lists some main issues for policy 
discussion and proposes some issues for future research.  
2. High inflation – an historical perspective
This section limits itself to a broad brush review of commodity price shocks in a longer time 
perspective. Exploring the reasons behind the price surge and the fall thereafter in the wake of 
the unfolding credit crisis is a separate research topic. Suffice it to say that the long cyclical 
expansion on the back of increased globalisation that first came to an end in the course of 
2008, the surge, fall and subsequent increase again in commodity prices, and the financial 
boom-bust are obviously interrelated phenomena. In other words, the so-called food and 
energy crises partly were linked to exuberant expectations and excess demand that were 
among the root causes of the credit crisis. However, the re-emergence of commodity price 
pressures suggests that this is only part of the story and that secular trends as well as cyclical 
and financial factors play a role in shaping commodity prices. 
From a longer time perspective, the recent surges in fuel and food prices are not 
unprecedented. Some parallels can be drawn with the developments in the 1970s. Of course, 
such comparisons should be made with due caution, given the momentous changes in the 
political landscape, in technologies, in the degree of global financial and economic 
integration. Moreover, there is large uncertainty over how the opposing forces of global 
recession on the one hand and economic catch-up and supply bottlenecks on the other will 
play out in the medium to long run. Even so, purely in terms of their size, it can be concluded 
that the most recent fuel and food price shocks are quite comparable to those that occurred in 
the 1970s. 
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6The first oil crisis in 1973 quadrupled the nominal price of oil denominated in US dollars 
(graph 1a). Shortly thereafter, the second oil crisis that started in 1978 almost tripled the 
nominal oil price. In contrast, in the run-up to the peak in 2008 the price of oil “only” roughly 
doubled in nominal terms, to double again after the dip reached at end-2008. 
The recent shocks in food prices were also not wholly unprecedented (graph 1b). Food price 
inflation expressed in US dollars peaked at more than 50% in the course of 2008, only to fall 
steeply afterwards as the downturn took hold and to pick up again to double-digit figures in 
the wake of global recovery. Even so, the rates of food inflation remained below the peaks 
recorded in the 1970s.4
As in the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, during intermediate episodes in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the fuel and food price shocks of the last few years significantly pushed up total inflation. 
This was even more the case in emerging and developing countries than in industrial 
countries.
After a steady period of historically relatively low – single-digit – inflation since 1999, 
several emerging and developing countries had once again entered double-digit inflation 
territory around the middle of 2008 as industrial countries also witnessed marked increases in 
inflation in comparison with the 'Goldilocks' 1990s. These price increases confronted policy 
makers with serious challenges, most obviously for commodity importers. But commodity 
exporters too, whilst benefiting from large terms-of-trade gains, faced important policy 
dilemmas. For them potentially unsustainable revenue flows needed to be channelled whilst 
avoiding financial and real bubbles and symptoms of Dutch disease –  posing challenges to 
the competiveness of other traded sectors. The sudden reversal in global commodity prices 
alleviated part of the strains faced by net commodity importers but led to financing problems 
among some exporters. And the most recent price swing brought to the fore again the same 
challenges stemming from terms-of-trade effects as on the eve of the global crisis. At any 
rate, the question how to respond to such extreme price volatility remained on the top of the 
agenda, most pressingly for emerging markets that heavily rely either on commodity imports 
or exports. 
4 See also IMF (2008) on the commodity price developments in an historical perspective. 
7The question arises what experiences one can draw from policy responses to strong price 
volatility in the past. With the benefit of hindsight, informed by advances in economic theory 
and thought, these past responses have often been misguided, aggravating and prolonging the 
fall-out from the initial shocks. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the dependence of many countries on crude oil and basic food 
imports meant that sharp price increases for these items put strong upward inflationary 
pressure on their economies. Economic activity suffered immediately from the declines in the 
terms of trade while inflation becoming entrenched in expectations led to even more serious 
consequences over the longer run. The combination of persistent inflation and real economy 
stagnation – stagflation – posed a major dilemma for the oil- and food-importing countries in 
terms of the then prevailing paradigm on the conduct of macro policy. On the one hand 
inflation needed to be contained, but on the other, it was generally felt that combatting 
inflation aggressively via the interest or exchange rate instruments would be too detrimental 
to economic activity to pursue. The tale is a familiar one. Without going into great detail, we 
would like to briefly review some key lessons learned from these episodes. 
One was drawn by some of the oil-importing countries with a fixed exchange rate peg to the 
effect that the price shocks added to other pressures on the exchange rate set-ups. For many 
countries, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system aggravated the impact of the oil crises. 
Another lesson learnt was that second round effects of initial price shocks can be detrimental 
if they are not quelled in the early stages. In the 1970s, countries suffering sharp negative 
terms-of-trade losses from commodity prices witnessed wage increases accompanying or 
following price increases, with the aim of compensating households for the fall in purchasing 
power. This triggered a wage-price spiral that was hard to stop. Higher wages acted as a 
negative externality, boosting the production costs of goods and services and pushing 
consumer prices further up. Breaking the wage-price spiral required government intervention 
on employees' wage developments to recover an optimal balance. In some countries, the 
situation became so unsustainable that only the sharp surge in unemployment rates and the 
ensuing adjustment in wages did trigger a break in the wage-price spiral.  
A third lesson drawn from these earlier episodes concerns the interference of governments 
with the pricing of market goods. The recessions in the countries concerned, triggered by rises 
8in world commodity prices, were further exacerbated by government price controls. In the 
US, for instance, there were price controls on oil. Newly found oil was rewarded with higher 
prices than the oil already on the market from existing sources, the idea being to stimulate oil 
exploration. But the opposite happened. Oil became scarce, and further rationing led to 
increased disruption in the economy, counter to the expected reaction.
Despite the apparent parallels between the recent commodity price shocks and those during 
the oil price crises in the 1970s, there are many important differences. While this paper does 
not aim to be exhaustive, we can mention the following: the causes of the initial price shocks, 
their direct effects on the economies concerned, the speed at which the cyclical downturn is 
translating into price declines, the macroeconomic policy reactions at the national and 
international level in view also of the evolving paradigm of appropriate policy reactions, and 
the degree of globalisation (prompting a much larger structural increase in commodity 
demand from leading emerging economies). Changes in the global production structure, in 
relative development levels among countries, in energy intensity and the propensity to 
consume basic food stuffs, in global financial and trade integration, and in transport and 
communication all make for a different setting for the conduct of policy.  
More concretely, at the current juncture one important issue is that the volatility of 
commodity prices occurred against the backdrop of exuberant growth (notably in emerging 
markets) turning swiftly into deep recession as the ongoing global financial crisis was pulling 
global economic activity down, only be followed by a steep but highly uneven rebound. The 
severe financial strains from the crisis entail a serious risk that the negative effects will be 
long lasting, with rounds of feed-through to the financial and real spheres of the global 
economy still not completed. Countries that at first sight seemed relatively shielded from the 
fall-out of the crisis, such as in the southern Mediterranean, did  feel the effects with a lag. 
The region’s limited financial integration acted as a partial buffer to the negative growth 
impact (despite the arguable large foregone growth opportunities due to the same relative 
isolation). The export mix of southern Meditteranean countries also helped limit the impact. 
The region's exports are is concentrated in products (oil, materials and light manufactures) 
that were not as sharply affected by the crisis as capital goods.  Reflecting a muted downturn, 
the region’s recovery was also more subdued than for other developing regions and this is 
expected to hold true for the next few years. 
9The ultimate sensitivity to global crisis of even less integrated regions has been exacerbated 
by the fact that the process of globalisation during the last few decades has made economies 
more interdependent and integrated, so that national policies such as rationing and price 
controls impact trading partners more quickly and sometimes also more severely. This has 
been illustrated by the large impact of some measures taken by big food staple exporting 
countries around the commodity price peak (such as export rationing). These measures 
triggered substantial reverberations in the global markets for those commodities. 
3. Food and total consumer price developments in the Mediterranean region 
An upward trend in food and energy inflation started to emerge worldwide in the course of 
2007, just before the global crisis. This trend was interrupted by the global crisis but re-
emerged more recently. But it continued in the course of 2010. The causes and policy 
reactions of the soaring prices have been hotly debated (Peeters and Strahilov, 2008). 
Whereas it is outside the scope of this paper to investigate in detail, price increases are 
generally seen to have been the result of a complex combination of both structural and 
temporary factors. In a nutshell, an increasing world population, a growing demand for higher 
“value added” food (including meat and dairy) products in emerging economies in fast catch-
up as well as the emergence of alternative market outlets (in particular for biofuels) all 
contributed to dynamic demand for agricultural commodities outstripping the growth in 
global supply. This led to tight agricultural commodity markets with historically low levels of 
international stocks that have apparently been unable to cushion a string of major weather-
related supply shortfalls in important producing countries. Further contributing factors have 
been the surge in energy prices, export restrictions imposed by a number of countries to avoid 
domestic shortages and the depreciation of the US dollar. Speculation has also been 
mentioned as a potential factor, although so far there is no conclusive evidence that it has had 
a structural as compared to transitory impact on food prices (or on commodity prices more 
generally). The subsequent fall of food and commodity prices in the second half of 2008 in 
the wake of global crisis in 2009 is generally seen as a response to the rapid cooling of global 
demand and easing of expectations, still leaving the question of what structural driving forces 
would determine price trends once cyclical conditions get more stable.  
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Benchmarking the swings in global food price inflation depends very much on the time 
perspective. Food prices as measured by the HWWA index in dollars were on average 33% 
higher in 2008 than in 2007, having no less than some 60% between June 2006 and June 2008 
(when the peak was reached). By end-2008, the average index of food commodity prices had 
declined by a third from the summer peak, , testifying to the speed of the price decline. 
However, as recovery took hold, global food prices also increased again and by end-2010 the 
HWWA food price index had reached again the nominal level of the earlier peak in mid-2008, 
indicating substantial price pressures in the pipeline. 
Food and overall inflation in the southern Mediterranean countries are very much driven by 
international developments, but with some differences in timing and obviously with country-
specific factors causing disparate impacts across the region. Notably, price subsidies for food 
staples have been an important determinant. On average, food prices exhibited strong 
increases outpacing the growth of overall inflation between end-2005 and mid-2008. Average 
overall consumer price inflation in the ENP Mediterranean countries was 3.4% in July 2007 
and it increased almost 7 percentage points to 10.0% in July 2008 (left graph in upper panel in 
Box 1). This was to a large extent caused by the sharp rise in food prices by 9% points, from 
5.8% to 14.8%, during this 12-months period (right graph in upper panel in Box 1). In middle 
income ENP Mediterranean countries (apart from Israel) real GDP has been growing faster 
than in developed countries and faster growth tends to go hand in hand with higher inflation. 
Nonetheless, an increase in inflation of 7% points during one year is substantial and can not 
only be accounted for by catch-up related factors. Inflationary pressures eased in the second 
half of 2008, reflecting the drop in global food and commodity prices and the onset of the 
financial crisis. However, the decreases was mitigated by downward price rigidities (box 2). 
Since, food inflation in the southern Meditteranean region picked up again on average albeit 
with a  large spread. Pipeline price pressures stemming for food and fuel price increases on 
globalo markets in the latter part of 2010 seem to indicate further inflationary impacts ahead. 
While agricultural commodity prices were the key driving force for food price developments 
in the MED region, there are visible divergences in price developments across countries. Over 
the period examined, food prices in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the oPt have 
shown stronger increases than in countries such as Tunisia or Morocco where the agricultural 
sectors are larger. Government subsidies on food products have mitigated the price rises, so 
that actual agricultural commodity prices had soared even more in case these subsidies would 
not have been provided. 
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Box 1 Developments of food and total inflation for the South Mediterranean 
countries and the EU12 
Total CPI inflation in the South-Mediterranean 
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These graphs illustrate the developments in inflation measured as the annual growth rate of the 
consumer price index at a monthly basis, for total CPI and food prices respectively, since January 
2006.  The “total – Mediterranean” and “food – Mediterranean” (in the upper graphs) are calculated as 
the simple averages of the national price indices of the Med countries Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Morocco, the oPt and Tunisia. Similarly, the indices “CPI – EU12” and “food – EU12” (in the lower 
graphs) are simple averages of the respective indices of the 12 most recently acceded EU member 
states. The measurement of “food” here mostly includes non-alcoholic beverages, but excludes 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The ranges indicate the minima and maxima inflation across the 
countries.
The price index for the 12 most recently acceded EU countries is the official Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). Food prices include both unprocessed and processed food.
Sources: National Offices of Statistics of the respective Med countries and Eurostat.
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The sharp fall in oil and agricultural commodity prices in the wake of the financial crisis has 
already resulted in a sharp deceleration of inflation in the twelve most recently acceded EU 
countries (graphs in lower panel of see Box 1). Average food inflation was in the group of 
these countries even negative, for some months in a row, and average HICP inflation dropped 
until 0.6%. In sharp contrast, the downward adjustment of inflation in the Mediterranean 
region was less pronounced pointing at stickiness or downward rigidities in prices. In Egypt 
total inflation hardly dropped under 10%. 
The information in Box 1 further shows that not only average inflation is far higher in the 
South-Mediterranean countries than in the most recently acceded EU countries, but that also 
the dispersion of inflation within the groups of countries is larger. Although the group of 
Mediterranean countries only counts seven countries, while the EU12 contains 12 countries, 
the range is wider. This points at big differences in price dynamics across the South 
Mediterranean countries. In particular, in times where average inflation goes up, the 
dispersion increases substantially across the South-Mediterranean countries.
Total CPI inflation goes up substantially more in case of positive shocks than it goes down in 
case of negative shocks. According to the results in Box 1 this seems to hold more for the 
South Mediterranean countries than for the EU12-countries. For the Med evidence for 
downward price rigidities is econometrically confirmed (see Box 2).5 In case prices do only 
react strongly to upward pressures, the primary aim for the central bank of price stability is 
hard to achieve. Such monetary instability is not helpful and can easily have a detrimental 
impact on the real side of the economy. Moreover, higher world food prices translating in 
higher consumer price inflation put pressure on the fiscal authorities to alleviate the higher 
cost from a social perspective. 
Empirical evidence has shown that people tend to spend relatively less on certain goods and 
services – what are often called “inferior” goods and services – in case their disposable 
income increases. In line with this, the relation between the share of food in the consumer 
price basket and income, measured as GDP per capita, at the national level, is also negative 
(see Graph 3).
5 Our econometric results are partly corroborated by Crowley (2010), who also estimates CPI 
inflation for South Mediterranean countries. In addition to Crowley’s analyses we however 
distinguish here between food price increases and food price decreases. 
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Box 2 Downward rigidity in consumer price inflation in South Mediterranean  
countries and the EU12 
Consumer price inflation in South Mediterranean countries goes quicker up than it goes down. 
This  phenomenon of downward stickiness implies that negative shocks to CPI inflation do not 
lead to a downward adjustment of consumer prices. In sharp contrast, positive shocks to CPI 
inflation lead to upward adjustment of  consumer prices.  
This follows from our estimation results for seven South Mediterranean countries as presented in 
the table here below. We test in particular for the effect of world food prices on CPI inflation, 
split into positive and negative shocks in these food prices. It follows that a 10% positive shock 
in world food prices  leads almost immediately to an almost 1% increase in CPI inflation. On the 
contrary, a 10% negative shock in world food prices does not depress CPI inflation. 
Econometric results of a system of CPI equations estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan oPt Morocco Tunisia
D12LOG(CPI)t-1 0.93 (8.35) 
1.38 
(12.7) 
1.21 
(11.1) 
1.28 
(11.8) 
1.20 
(10.1) 
1.17 
(11.4) 
1.15 
(8.05) 
D12LOG(CPI)t-2 -0.27 (-2.45) 
-0.48 
(-4.57) 
-0.26 
(-2.44) 
-0.39 
(-3.61) 
-0.39 
(-3.31) 
-0.28 
(-2.70) 
-0.34 
(-2.36) 
constant 0.01 (3.18) 
0.01 
(2.40) 
-0.00 
(-0.29) 
0.005 
(1.53) 
1.17 
(11.4) 
0.00 
(1.60) 
   0.006 
(2.36) 
P*D12LOG(FOOD)t-1 0.011 (3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
0.011 
(3.60) 
N*D12LOG(FOOD)t-1 0.001 (0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
Number of obs. 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.92 0.84 
Note: The endogenous variables are the twelfth difference of the logarithm of the consumer price index for each of 
the countries, denoted by D12LOG(CPI)t. Explanatory variables are, as denoted above, the first and second lagged 
endogenous variable, a constant and the world food prices split into increasing and decreasing prices. P is a dummy 
that equals one in case the twelfth difference of the food price index is positive and zero elsewise. N is a dummy that 
equals one in case the twelfth difference of the food price index is negative and zero elsewise. The t-values are 
reported in brackets. The two lagged endogenous variables are included per country to account for residual 
autocorrelation. In addition to this, across the equations the restriction that the reaction coefficient of the world food 
price is the same for all South Mediterranean countries is imposed in order to have sufficient degrees of freedom for 
estimating this system of regressions. The sample period is March 2006 – April 2010. 
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- This is Box 2 continued from the previous page - 
Response of CPI inflation to a 10% shock in world food prices
% changes in deviation from  the base
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37
periods (in months)
Algeria
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Morocco
Occupied Palestinian territories
Tunisia
positive shock 
to world food 
prices
negative shock
to world food 
prices
On the basis of our econometric results the response of consumer price inflation in the South 
Mediterranean countries to shocks in the world food price is illustrated in the graph above.  A 
shock of 10% in comparison with the baseline is simulated in periods 0 to 3. It follows that this 
shock puts pressure on consumer price inflation in comparison with the baseline. CPI inflation in 
Egypt reacts strongest with up to 0.7% in comparison with the baseline. CPI inflation in Algeria 
increases the least. In Israel and the oPt the impact of the shock on CPI inflation lasts longest.
This same graph illustrates the response of consumer price inflation to a negative shock in world 
food prices of 10% in comparison with the baseline. The simulated shock takes place in periods 
28 to 31. This hardly leads to a decrease in consumer price inflation (but is insignificant 
according to the estimation results). This underlines the downward rigidities in consumer price 
inflation in the South Mediterranean countries.
Source: Own calculations, that are available upon request. 
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With the exception of Israelis, people in the ENP Mediterranean countries spend a relatively 
large share of their income on food: 35% to 55%. In Israel, this number is far lower, at 17%, 
but it has a higher GDP per capita (comparable with Slovenia). The share of food inflation in 
total inflation in the region has been extremely high at some points during the price upsurge, 
as much as 60% and 80%. This shows once more the extent to which food inflation had put 
considerable upward pressure on total prices in the ENP Mediterranean countries.  
In some countries the situation became extremely difficult when food and fuel prices soared. 
Shortages on the primary food product markets, such as bread and rice, have had an 
immediate and drastic impact on the ability of households under the poverty line to meet their 
basic needs. In addition to these problems, the soaring consumer prices have been forcing 
countries to make strategic policy choices. The decline in prices for commodities and 
agricultural staples since the middle of 2008 brought some relief. But the more recent 
turnaround in prices suggests that this relief for a part may only have been partial. Moreover, 
because of delays in the pass-through to consumer prices, consumers have been the last to 
reap the benefits from the easing of commodity and staple prices in the wake of the global 
crisis. The next section investigates whether the fiscal authorities managed to gain fiscal 
breathing space from the decline in commodity prices in terms of lower subsidy outlays. 
 Graph 3:  Income and weight of food in the CPI-basket
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4. The impact of food and fuel prices on government budgets and subsidies 
Government subsidies, in particular on food products, have played an important role for 
decades in most of the ENP Mediterranean countries. Subsidies were stepped up in in the 
1970s. Although largely unaffected by the oil price shocks during the two oil crises, some 
countries were nevertheless faced with a sharp food price crisis at the end of the 1970s. Food 
policy was oriented towards “food security” and food management institutions such as the so-
called Caisses Générale de Compensation (CGC) were set up or reorganised and intensified 
across the region in that period. The CGCs make up the difference between the market price 
and the fixed, below market, price set for these food products to compensate food distributors.  
In the southern Mediterranean region, the food subsidy system is therefore still a major 
component of the social safety net for the poor, guaranteeing the availability of affordable 
staples, helping to reduce infant mortality and malnutrition and mitigate the adverse effects of 
economic reform and structural adjustment. The history of how the currency subsidy systems 
came into being puts their size in perspective. Because of their institutional entrenchment, 
only pre-announced and carefully communicated steps will make it possible for the 
governments to successfully and smoothly reform the subsidy systems.   
In reaction to the surge in food and fuel prices that culminated initially in 2008, governments 
were faced with higher outlays for subsidies, notably on food products and energy. Apart 
from the higher-than-planned fiscal expenditures on food and fuel subsidies, several 
governments in ENP Mediterranean countries took other policy measures to counter the price 
impact. These consisted of a varying mix of measures, including the diminishing or 
abolishing of tariffs and duties on imported food, the imposition of export taxes on certain 
grains or even the banning of exports of certain grains. Several of these proved ill-conceived 
and arguably heightened overall distortions in the economy. Also, some countries in the 
region switched to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement, so that the macroeconomic 
effects of the initial shock on the domestic economy could pass through in a more mitigated 
and cushioned way. 
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Box 3 Food and fuel subsidies in the individual South Mediterranean  
countries as percentage of GDP 
Algeria
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Food 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.5 1.8
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 proj. 2010
Egypt 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Other 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8
Petroleum 6.8 5.4 6.7 6.0 5.5
Food 1.2 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.4
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 prel. FY10
- Box 3 continues on the next page -
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Israel 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Total 2.7 7.2 5.4 5.3 5.7 4.4 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 pr. 10
Jordan 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Petroleum 0.6 1.2 3.2 5.6 2.8 2.7 1.2 0.2 0.4
Food 0 0 0 0.6 0.8 1.8 1.4 0.8 0.5
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
proj. 
2010
- Box 3 continues on the next page
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Lebanon 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Unclassfied treasury
expenditures (including fuel
subsidies)
1.4 2.5 2.6 10.9 10.8 12.0 10.8 11.1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
proj. 
2010
Morocco 
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Petroleum 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.3 3.9 3.7 1.5 1.2
Food 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 -1.2 0.8 0.1 0.6
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 proj. 2010
Occupied Palestinian Territories 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Total 0.3 8.3
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 proj. 2010
- Box 3 continues on the next page - 
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Syria
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Explicit food 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8
Explicit total 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.6
Implicit petroleum 3.3 6.4 9.6 10.2 10.3 12.9 4.9
Total (explicit and implicit) 5.9 8.8 11.9 12.5 12.9 9.1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
proj. 
2010
Tunisia 
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Petroleum 0.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.6 0.8 1.0
Food 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.1 1.6 1.4
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 proj. 2010
Note: Empty cells are years for which information is not (yet) available. Background information and 
all presented statistics are available upon request.  
Sources: Ministries of Finances and Central Banks of the respective Med countries, IMF Article IVs 
and own calculations.
21
Box 4 Food and fuel subsidies in the individual South Mediterranean  
countries as percentage of current government expenditures 
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
proj. 2010
Algeria
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Morocco
OPT
Syria
Tunisia
Algeria 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 9.9 7.0 7.7
Egypt 4.6 4.8 6.7 8.1 27.4 25.2 30.9 27.2 26.2
Israel 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 3.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5
Jordan 1.8 3.3 11.1 18.9 11.9 14.5 9.3 3.9 3.8
Morocco 4.9 7.2 8.8 10.7 12.4 19.9 7.8 8.9
OPT 0.7 27.6
Syria 15.0 12.4 12.4 13.7 12.6 17.1 14.4 14.6
Tunisia 4.1 3.5 5.1 11.8 13.6 15.7 17.7 11.6 11.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 proj. 2010
Note: Empty cells are years for which information is not (yet) available.  
Sources: Ministries of Finances of the respective Med countries, IMF Article IVs, own calculations.
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The developments show that many countries have faced higher food and fuel subsidies in 
2007-2008 – as could be expected because of the upward price trends for these products– in 
comparison with the preceding years. For food, this is evidently the case for Algeria, Jordan 
and Tunisia. Fuel subsidies mainly started increasing recently in Morocco. Another 
distinguishing feature is that Jordan and Tunisia spend more on food subsidies than on fuel 
subsidies.
Expressing subsidies in terms of the current government expenditures shows the potential 
room for manoeuvre for other expenditures (see Box 4). In 2007, subsidies on food and fuel in 
the ENP Mediterranean countries ranged from 2.3% of the current government expenditures 
in Israel, to more than 25% of the current government expenditures in Egypt. Also, the oPt 
and Syria spend more than 20% of their current expenditures on subsidies. Perhaps 
surprisingly, for most countries the weight of government outlays on fuel subsidies has been 
notably higher than on food. In general, for energy subsidies, targeting would typically be less 
easily achieved. Hence, the scope to reduce distortions by reforming subsidy systems appears 
greater for energy than for food.  
On the basis of currently available information6 it is clear that the uptrend in food and energy 
prices led to notable increases in subsidies paid out by governments in the southern 
Mediterranean region, in particular in the few years just before the global crisis. In the wake 
of the strong surge in prices in the first half of 2008, budgets in several countries were 
adapted to take the expected impact on outlays into account. Yet, in several south 
Mediterranean countries concerns about possible social and political ramifications may have 
induced reluctance to quickly overhaul the subsidies system. 
The peak in commodity prices subsided at the onset of the global crisis and the response 
subsidy flows is difficult to gauge. National budgets were adjusted during the global crisis 
year 2009 and the data indicate an easing of the fiscal burden. Yet, , for many countries, the 
6 This paper uses multiple data sources, including information from the Ministries of Finance, the country Article 
IVs and Government Finance Statistics (GFS) from the IMF. In some countries, EU Delegations assisted in  
gathering data. The cross-country and cross-time comparability of the different data sets is complicated by 
presentation of data at different levels of aggregation, sudden changes in classification, interruptions in the time 
series, extra-budgetary accounts and, sometimes, missing information for specific budget items or recent years. 
Unfortunately, this contribution does not cover the whole period 2002-2009 for each of the countries due to the 
lack of information on subsidies in the (draft) budgets. Moreover, a note of caution must be given concerning the 
definition of “subsidies” and the blurred distinction between subsidies, transfers and other fiscal instruments 
(like “other” or “tax arrears” or “negative taxes”). Against this background, in our view government subsidies 
will be far higher than shown in the figures here.  
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lower commodity prices did only lead to slightly lower subsidies as a lower GDP than in 
2008. For some countries, the lower commodity prices even went hand in hand with higher 
government subsidies to government expenditures (Algeria). Price increases for food and 
commodity during the recovery from the crisis in 2009 and in particular in 2010 suggest a 
marked increase in public outlays on subsidies will again occur, if no compensatory measures 
are taken. 
At the same time, the higher food and fuel prices did not always have a negative impact on 
the government budget. In Egypt in FY08 and Jordan in 2008, in particular, fuel subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP diminished by almost 1 percentage point despite the fact that total 
inflation rose by respectively 6.7 and 4.9 percentage points at an annual rate. These may be 
seen as the effect of successful reforms in the subsidy systems achieved in difficult 
conditions.
There are different degrees to which countries succeeded in implementing reforms, . Some 
countries have reduced their subsidies in nominal terms. Others managed to achieve a 
nominal stagnation in their subsidies, which translates in terms of the ration to GDP into a 
rather big improvement. On the other hand, some countries may have started reforms in their 
subsidy systems that do not yet show up in the figures presented above. 
Data issues hinder the comparability of the figures presented. The issue of administered prices 
is not incorporated in the estimates presented below. In Algeria, for instance, the government 
budget does not show energy subsidies while the authorities provide energy price “support” or 
“implicit subsidies” by keeping energy prices fixed at prices that are lower than the market 
prices.
Nonetheless, the bottom line emerging from the data gathered is quite clear. Soaring 
commodity prices in 2007-2008 entailed a substantial increase in subsidies and the 
government balances in some countries. The burden that subsidies impose on the government 
balances had already been heavy in most countries in the region before the price surges, but 
became even heavier. The future will show to what extent the latent soaring commodity prices 
after the global crisis may bring additional pressure on government budgets. 
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The importance of subsidies for government finances and economic policy in the southern 
Mediterranean is underlined by international comparisons. In general, the expenditure on 
subsidies in the region is high compared to other groups of middle income countries. Just to 
take the EU as a reference, in the 10 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) 
countries that joined the European Union in 2004 subsidies were also key elements of the 
centralised system of economic planning. Subsidy reform in these countries started in the 
early 1990s. From 1995 until 2005 the CEEC countries reduced subsidies on average by 
almost 50%, from 2.1% of GDP to 1.2%. Of these countries, Slovakia had the heaviest 
subsidy system and reformed most, from 4.7% to 1.3% of GDP (so 3.4  percentage points) in 
a decade (see Mulas-Granados et al., 2008).
5. Overview of subsidy systems 
In order to recommend policy makers on the policy options concerning subsidy systems that 
are most cost efficient and fairest from the point of view of income distribution, this section 
gives an overview of a spectrum of systems. Due to the complexity of possible subsidy 
systems this overview is neither complete nor exhaustive. Instead, the aim is to describe the 
key mechanisms of subsidy systems, pointing out the pros and cons from the point of view of 
cost efficiency and income distributional fairness in order to have the main ingredients for a 
subsequent discussion. 
Empirically, this basic question is already difficult to frame in a theoretical approach. Given 
the many nuances in the systems that prevail in the Southern Mediterranean region the blurred 
line between subsidies, direct and indirect price support, administrative controls, trade and 
market interventions and transfers cannot be drawn without leaving room for interpretation. 
For the purposes of our argument, we classify both untargeted direct price subsidies as well as 
so-called self-targeted subsidies (for goods or varieties of which consumption declines with 
rising income) as clearly falling within the definition. Also included (albeit of a different 
nature) are what one could call indirect or implicit subsidies via price controls (benchmarked 
against world market-based yardsticks) and import or export restrictions or monopolies 
directly controlled by the government (already here the distinction can easily become blurred 
in practical terms). In the region, many countries operate some form of equalisation or special 
funds which pool centralised budgetary resources and direct them to specific uses (often 
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channelled via various layers of administration) that fall within our broad definition of 
subsidies. Obviously, the complicated operations involved blur the distinction between 
subsidies and other public financial operations. So does the interpretation of a subsidised 
'shadow price' calculated against world market benchmarks. Evidence on quotas (or rationed 
subsidies) via targeted and limited access to subsidised items (e.g. via vouchers) is more rare. 
Conversely, transfers or income support that are not directly linked to the consumption of 
goods and services would clearly fall outside the scope of subsidies as defined for the purpose 
of this paper, even if in the statistics the dividing line between subsidies and transfers cannot 
always be clearly made. 
Despite these caveats, the various subsidy forms outlined above can be identified to a 
substantial degree. The next issue is to examine what purpose they serve and how they would 
be impacted by changes in the system. 
In case a country has a heavy subsidy system in place, with a substantial burden on public 
finances, it will be hard to abolish the system within a certain time horizon. For such a 
country a gradualistic approach seems the only feasible one and initially it will typically be 
easier to move to an “intermediate” kind of subsidy system. For this reason we wish to review 
the (dis-)advantages of the different types of subsidy systems from one extreme (very costly 
and/or unfair) to the other extreme (least costly and/or fair).  
From a theoretical perspective, the rationale for subsidies stems from some form of market 
failure that they aim to address, that is when a difference exists between the actual price 
without government intervention and what is deemed the socially optimal price, for instance 
due to externalities not fully reflected in market prices. Subsidies can also be considered as a 
second-best solution in cases where other instruments to correct market failures would be less 
optimal. In any event, for policy makers it is also important to consider the implementation 
and transaction costs associated with subsidies. For instance, administrative hurdles in 
identifying target groups can pose burdens while indentifying recipients of subsidies and 
implementing subsidies in such a way that abuses are avoided are not costless. Set-ups where 
these costs of implementation are minimised reduce distortions. In addition, flexible systems 
that can be adjusted relatively rapidly - also to reduce the costs to the public budget – help 
mitigate the budgetary impact of unforeseen adverse shocks to the system. 
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Most countries that provide food price subsidies maintain a universal system. In its most basic 
form it means that the subsidy applies to anybody buying the product. 
A main disadvantage of universal price subsidies is that price signals are distorted. Also, there 
is no distributional fairness as richer people can also buy the product at the lower price. As 
another disadvantage, this system can be costly for governments because of the incentive for 
people to take advantage. The economy-wide distortions associated with such a system tend 
to be large. 
A universal system can also be targeting implicitly certain income groups. This happens in 
case a product is targeted which is disproportionally bought more by poor households.
Here similar disadvantages in terms of cost inefficiency and distortions apply as under the 
universal system, although the extent to which they occur will be less.
In a targeted subsidy system the subsidies are only paid to those that can afford the least to 
pay for the scarce products (e.g. basic food or fuel). Among the targeted subsidy systems 
there is the administered targeting approach and, even better, the self-targeted approach.
The advantage of the self-targeted system is that the households themselves determine 
whether they need the subsidy or not, while the government decides on their eligibility. This 
has the preference over an administered targeting approach, where the government will decide 
on the eligibility of households for a subsidy, for instance on the basis of their income. A self-
targeted subsidy system outperforms other subsidy systems in terms of distributional fairness7
and costs to the government, but is quite hard to implement.  
In general, short-term compensatory measures for poorer households should preferably focus 
on income transfers to reduce the loss in real income due to higher commodity prices. 
Optimal interventions thus steer away from subsidies. Direct income transfers should be 
preferred to measures such as food or fuel vouchers. For fuel this seems to be even more 
clearly the case than for food. In the case of fuel, vouchers provide no signal coming from 
7 We see “distributional fairness” as the case where low-income households receive a higher percentage of 
subsidies in terms of their income than high-income households and where at the same time the low-income 
households consume the major share of the total amount of subsidies. If not, the subsidy system is regressive 
(implying that rich people have a bigger advantage than the needy). 
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higher energy prices and, hence, reduce incentives (such as to save energy and use it more 
efficiently). Short-term measures to help the weakest groups could also be complemented by 
more structural measures to reduce the energy demand from these households, e.g. support for 
investments in better insulation and more energy-efficient appliances. 
Anyhow, substantial reforms in subsidy systems will only be possible gradually. This holds in 
particular for food subsidies, as past experiences have shown that the social consequences can 
be quite far-reaching, with potential implications also on the political side. The recent unrest 
in Algeria and in particular the sweeping political changes in Tunisia were protests over high 
prices were among the triggers underline the point. In this sense policy makers will have to 
take not only the economic, but also the political consequences into account. Moreover, the 
institutional capabilities of government to improve targeting and let it go had in hand with 
reduced market imperfections are an important factor determining success. 
6. Summary of findings and policy issues 
In many developing countries, in particular in South-Mediterranean countries, energy and 
consumer food subsidies are a major part of the social security safety net schemes. The 
upward trend in food and energy prices that started to emerge worldwide in the course of 
2007, just before the global crisis, caused riots in the streets of Egypt until the Egyptian 
authorities intervened by among others the army baking additional bread. In the course of 
2010, during the recovery from the global crisis, basic commodity prices started rising again 
on the back of the upsurge in global demand and were among the reasons for uproar in 
Tunisia and Algeria, finally leading to regime change in Tunisia. The eruption of social unrest 
is one of the tangible externalities of the scarcity of food and energy. In several countries, 
concerns about for the potential social and political effects of a rapid overhaul of the subsidy 
system may in part account for inertia in implementing reforms. 
In spite of such incidental eruptions of social unrest, South-Mediterraneaan countries have by 
and large succeeded to maintain the purchasing power of subsidy recipients in the wake of 
soaring prices and economic slowdown. Nonetheless, the existing subsidy systems in the 
region have also proven inefficient and are putting an increasing burden on government 
budgets, especially in view of the increase in world commodity prices in recent years (despite 
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a brief pause during the global crisis years 2008 and 2009). Maintaining the current subsidy 
systems seems fiscally unsustainable in light of the downward rigidities in prices what seem 
to be structural supply shortages of basic commodities, unless countries make their own 
provisions. Potential macro-economic implications are wider and include the impact on 
external balances, the financing of fiscal deficits, and on the development of the financial 
sector. Deteriorating public finances, possibly in combination with political economy risks, 
may increase financing costs and limit access to foreign sources of public funding. This might 
induce further financial problems by increase in local market funding, possibly crowding out 
private investment, with also knock-on effects on financial integration and financial sector 
development.  
This paper provides a comparative analysis of food and fuel subsidies and price impacts 
across Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, 
Syria and Tunisia for the period 2002-2010. The nominal and real value of these subsidies 
turns out to be substantial and, for some countries, even usurping a worryingly large share of 
the current government expenditures of up to more than 10% in recent years. This is very high 
in comparison to other regions in the world and indicates quite substantial distortions in the 
region's economy. The South-Mediterranean countries have a high potential to catch up with 
the developed economies. But in order to help achieve this, the fiscal burden of the subsidies 
needs to be reduced to create more fiscal space and possibly more room for additional 
spending on growth-enhancing measures. This is the main policy recommendation of this 
paper. There are several ways of pursuing this policy objective, mainly through improved 
targeting. As public sector energy outlays are higher than food outlays, the largest 
achievements can be made by reforming energy subsidies.  
As far as possible policy implications are concerned, below we raise some additional issues 
for discussion in relation to soaring prices, notably as regards the challenges to macro, in 
particular fiscal, policies. We do not claim to offer a comprehensive framework to inform a 
policy discussion, or to put forward prescriptive policy options. Rather, our aim is to distil 
some broad themes and tendencies from the empirically-oriented approach offered in this 
paper. Needless to say, the appropriate response for any particular country is determined to a 
large extent by country-specific (also political) circumstances that impact the trade-off 
between short- and long-term considerations. With these caveats in mind, relevant issues for 
discussion may include the following: 
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• In the short term, under unchanged policies the strong terms-of-trade shocks stemming 
from high volatility in food and energy prices puts government finances under strain 
from the impact on subsidies. Rigidities to downward price adjustments heighten the 
challenges. To the extent that structural factors would precipitate a continuing global 
uptrend in commodity prices when cyclical conditions normalise, this would put an 
increasing burden on public expenditure under unchanged policies. 
• In the near term, marked swings in real disposable income to the whole economy 
cannot be fully avoided, even though they may be cushioned by subsidies. In general, 
relative prices should be allowed to adjust to terms-of-trade shocks, while allowing 
some cushioning against the impact of short-term over- and undershooting of prices 
for traded items.  
• However, it should be acknowledged that in some cases there is an imperative need to 
cushion the impact on a subset of domestic agents. 
• Reforms in the subsidies systems may occur along several dimensions for those 
governments with high levels of subsidies in terms of spending as a share of nominal 
GDP. Phasing out the subsidies over several years seems to be a promising avenue. 
Safety nets can be re-designed to improve targeting (where possible by promoting 
self-targeting) in such a way that regressive effects are phased out. In this way only 
the most needy will be protected from excessive price rises. This could also help 
reduce price distortions which invite overconsumption of subsidised items and induce 
substantial distortions and static and dynamic inefficiencies in the macro economy. 
Reforms in subsidy systems would have to go hand in hand with reforms of 
administered (food or fuel) prices.  
• Subsidy reforms and improved targeting could help reduce rigidities in the 
government budgets and alleviate the fiscal burden, creating more fiscal room for 
manoeuvre. Such reforms should be accompanied by improved administration 
capabilities in order to be effective.  
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• Subsidies impact the whole energy and even more complex food supply chain.The 
length of the chain should be reduced as much as possible. Long and cumbersome 
chains invite corruption and impose a higher administrative burden, thus putting 
upward pressure on market prices. Moreover, they may contribute to increases in 
margins along the supply chain that would inhibit a swift adjustment of final consumer 
prices to input prices and would thus become a source of price rigidities. 
• There is a need to try to avoid second round effects of terms-of trade shocks that can 
trigger a wage-price spiral and/or staggered responses of margins that would entail 
welfare losses. Measures to avoid such a dynamic can contribute to profitability, fiscal 
sustainability and job and growth prospects. 
While the short-term impact of adverse shocks cannot be fully avoided, their long-term 
consequences can be in principle addressed by a supply response. In this respect, 
enhancing food supply is an obvious candidate and should be stimulated as much as 
possible. Supply can be boosted both by increased production on the one hand, and by 
more efficient distribution and improved market access on the other. For energy, 
improvements in energy efficiency would constitute a key supply response.
• In order to achieve a supply response, the price mechanism should work in as 
uninhibited a way as possible. Arguably, relatively high prices for basic agricultural 
products in domestic markets, with the least possible government financial aid, will 
give an incentive to the agricultural sector to explore new and expand existing 
opportunities to cultivate basic and/or alternative food products. Targeted measures to 
compensate the associated losses in purchasing power for specific groups in society 
appear to be a logical complement. That said, it is understood that the structure and 
functioning of the middle-income countries in the region is quite different from 
advanced economies, shaping a different supply response. In particular, important 
institutional rigidities would have to be overcome to ensure an improved 
supply/demand balance. 
• It is critical to avoid the transmission of distorting price shocks via international trade 
channels, for instance through ill-designed protectionist measures. 
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• On a similar note, it may be worth also considering the of monetary policies and the 
exchange rate regime, in particular as regards the effect of exchange rate policies on 
the pass-through of commodity price shocks. 
• It is imperative to exploit the opportunities from financial and economic integration in 
a well-sequenced way to cushion the negative impact of terms-of trade shocks on the 
real economy, on balance sheets, and on confidence. This must be accompanied by 
adequate supervision in order to avoid imbalances in the national and global systems. 
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